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The Arctic is defined by change. Many understand this through the 
region’s biannual shift between a frozen desert of snow and ice, and a 
warmer and highly productive environment. Others know this through 
the great effect that climate change is having on the circumpolar north. 
Nonetheless, beyond physical transitions, dynamism is also the name of 
the game when it comes to how we conceive of and approach the Arctic 
through international law, politics, and policy. The “melting Arctic ice 
transforms the region from one of primarily scientific interest into a 
maelstrom of competing commercial, national security and 
environmental concerns,”1 not to mention those of governance and 
development. Is the Arctic an expanse of unclaimed territory and 
resources to be scrambled for; a chance at indigenous self-determination; 
a rare enclave of untouched nature needing protection; or another 
contentious arena along the deepening rift between Russia and the West?  
As it stands, each of these conceptions finds purchase in modern 
Arctic discourse. However, the extents to which the High North is 
presented and thought of in such manners are constantly shifting, 
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 1. Charles K. Ebinger & Evie Zambetakis, The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt, 85 
INT’L AFF. 1215, 1215 (2009).  
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depending on the fluctuating influence of different interests, geopolitics, 
and the region’s changing physical landscape. In turn, how we conceive 
the Arctic has an enormous impact on international relations and legal 
and policy approaches. The course of the epic struggle for the 
representation of the Arctic is therefore of great importance to both 
regional actors and the global community, and has “profound 
implications for the international legal and political system[s].”2  
Using the analytical framework developed by Philip Steinberg, 
Jeremy Tasch, and Hannes Gerhardt in their book, Contesting the Arctic: 
Politics and Imaginaries in the Circumpolar North,3 this Article aims to 
parse out the current status and future of the aforementioned process. 
Steinberg et al., present the ongoing contest to frame and approach the 
Arctic as between competing “imaginaries—ideas about what the Arctic 
is and about what it can, or should, be.”4 This Article will assess and 
build on the imaginaries established by Steinberg et al., with sections 
focusing on the conceptions of the Arctic as a place of competition for 
territory and resources, a chance for native sovereignty, a region in 
desperate need of stronger environmental protection, and an arena for 
strategic confrontation. The accuracy of these narratives in describing the 
current state of Arctic affairs will be examined, as will their self-
fulfilling capabilities. That is, even if a given imaginary actually poorly 
captures the current state of Arctic affairs, its strong and widespread 
reinforcement can lead countries to approach the region in such a 
manner.  
Through the assessment of the main Arctic imaginaries, this Article 
also seeks to counteract the sensationalism that has come to infect 
mainstream Arctic discourse. Both scholars and pundits often focus far 
too heavily on strict environmentalism, territory, riches, and conflict 
rather than delving into the history of the region, its people, and how 
states are actually interacting in the High North.  
A key example of the influence that Arctic imaginaries and 
uninformed discourse can have, for better or worse, is the 2008 Ilulissat 
  
 2. Id. 
 3. PHILIP E. STEINBERG, JEREMY TASCH & HANNES GERHARDT, CONTESTING THE 
ARCTIC: POLITICS AND IMAGINARIES IN THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH (2015) (providing the 
analytical framework employed by this Article). 
 4. Id. at 9. 
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Declaration.5 This document, signed by the five Arctic littoral states, is 
“notable in that it broke absolutely no new diplomatic or political 
ground.”6 The declaration simply puts forth that the five states formally 
agree that the international governing structure of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies to the Arctic 
Ocean, as it has since it was created, and as it does to all oceans.7  
Why would the existing regime need to be formally asserted and 
signed onto in such a manner? “Presumably, the only reason to produce a 
declaration asserting that the Arctic is ‘normal’ would be if someone else 
were suggesting otherwise.”8 To be sure, there are many “someones” 
suggesting that the Arctic is not normal. Enter the battle of Arctic 
imaginaries.  
I.  TERRITORY AND RICHES: RACING TO THE ARCTIC 
The Arctic is predominantly an ocean, which means that the majority 
of it is subject to UNCLOS—to which all Arctic countries but the United 
States are party to,9 and which the United States recognizes as customary 
international law.10 The Convention contains specific provisions 
  
 5. The Ilulissat Declaration: Arctic Ocean Conference, May 27–29, 2008, 
available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf. 
 6. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.  
 7. The Ilulissat Declaration: Arctic Ocean Conference, supra note 5, at 1 (“[W]e 
recall that an extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean. . . . 
Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the 
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine 
environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific 
research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to 
the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”).   
 8. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 2.  
 9. Div. for Ocean Aff. & the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS, Chronological 
Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related 
Agreements, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last 
updated Jan. 7, 2015).  
 10. E.g., United States Oceans Policy, Statement by the President (Mar. 10, 
1983), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/143224.pdf (stating that 
UNCLOS “contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which 
generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of 
all states”); Off. of Gen. Couns., NOAA, Submarine Cables, 
http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_submarine_cables.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) 
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allocating sovereignty, jurisdiction, and rights depending on a given 
marine area’s distance from a state’s coast or its status as a continuation 
of a country’s continental shelf.11  
In turn, and unlike Antarctica—which has essentially been 
“internationalized”12—all land in the High North falls very clearly under 
the sovereignty of Arctic states.  
Still, despite the demarcated and rules-based nature of Arctic 
international law and governance, the misconception continues that 
somehow areas of this region and its resources are up for grabs. 
Mainstream media outlets constantly portray northern activity as being 
carried out within the context of a mad dash to control the Arctic.13 Even 
scholars engage in such presentations.14  
  
(“Although the United States is not a party to [UNCLOS], it considers much of the 
Convention—including its provisions pertaining to the rights of coastal States within 
their continental shelves and exclusive economic zones—as reflective of customary 
international law.”); Andrew J. Norris, The “Other” Law of the Sea, 64 NAVAL WAR C. 
REV. 78, 78 (2011) (“Even the United States, which has not ratified UNCLOS, considers 
most of its provisions to reflect, or to have achieved the status of, customary international 
law and thus to be binding on nations that do not specifically decline to adhere to them.”).  
 11. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, parts II–VIII, XI, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].  
 12. Erika Lennon, A Tale of Two Poles: A Comparative Look at the Legal 
Regimes in the Arctic and the Antarctic, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 32, 35 (2008) 
(“[T]he Antarctic Treaty prevents countries from making sovereign claims over the 
region.”). See also The Antarctic Treaty, pmbl., Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794. 
 13. E.g., Chris Arsenault, A Scramble for the Arctic, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 8, 2010, 
12:42 PM),  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2010/11/20101130181427770987.html 
(“Global warming, partially caused by burning fossil fuels, is largely responsible for the 
new scramble for the northern region, as once impenetrable ice blocks melt at an 
alarming rate.”); Bob Reiss, In the Race to Control the Arctic, the U.S. Lags Behind, 
NEWSWEEK (July 6, 2015, 6:27 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/07/17/united-
states-not-winning-race-control-arctic-349973.html (“The Arctic, which covers 8 percent 
of the Earth’s surface, is warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet. With all that ice 
melting, the region is in danger of becoming a 21st-century Wild West—a free-for-all for 
power and riches opening up at the top of the planet.”).   
 14. E.g., RICHARD SALE & EUGENE POTAPOV, THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ARCTIC: 
OWNERSHIP, EXPLOITATION AND CONFLICT IN THE FAR NORTH 9 (Francis Lincoln, 2010) 
(“[T]he scramble for the Arctic’s minerals may lead to conflicts that threaten not only 
iconic animals, but world peace itself.”); Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The 
Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 63, 64 (2008) 
(asserting that “[a]rctic powers are racing to carve up the region”).  
2016] Imagining the Arctic 603 
A flag planting in the summer of 2007 was a large catalyst to the 
modern idea of the Arctic as a place of vigorous competition over 
territory and resources.15 The flag was a one meter-high, titanium 
Russian flag, placed on the Arctic seabed at the North Pole.16 Conducted 
by the Russian explorer and parliamentary deputy Artur Chilingarov 
using a mini-submarine, the undertaking was celebrated by the Russian 
government as a great national accomplishment.17 Russian President 
Vladimir Putin even personally called the members of the expedition to 
congratulate them on “‘the outstanding scientific project.’”18 
Nevertheless, there were no official governmental assertions that the act 
represented territorial acquisition. In fact, President Putin and Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly stated the opposite.19 
Yet not all Russians were so reserved on the issue. With regard to the 
expedition, Chilingarov himself said things like, “Russia must win. 
Russia has what it takes to win. The Arctic has always been Russian,”20 
and, “‘[t]he Arctic is ours and we should manifest our presence.’”21 The 
  
 15. Russia Plants Flag Under N Pole, BBC (Aug. 2, 2007, 5:22 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. (quoting a spokesman for the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Institute as 
saying, “It’s a very important move for Russia to demonstrate its potential in the Arctic . . 
. . It’s like putting a flag on the moon.”).  
 18. Russia Plants Flag on Arctic Floor, CNN (Aug. 4, 2007, 6:43 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/02/arctic.sub.reut/index.html?eref=yahoo.  
 19. E.g., Nicholas Breyfogle & Jeffrey Dunifon, Russia and the Race for the 
Arctic, ORIGINS (Aug. 2012), http://origins.osu.edu/article/russia-and-race-arctic#origins-
article (quoting Russian President Vladimir Putin as saying, “[d]on’t worry. Everything 
will be all right. I was surprised by a somewhat nervous reaction from our Canadian 
colleagues. Americans, at one time, planted a flag on the moon. So what? Why didn’t you 
worry so much? The moon did not pass into the United States’ ownership”); Russia 
Plants Flag on Arctic Floor, supra note 18 (quoting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov as saying, “[t]he aim of this expedition is not to stake Russia’s claim but to show 
that our shelf reaches to the North Pole”).  
 20. Alex Shoumatoff, The Arctic Oil Rush, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 14, 2008, 12:00 
AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/05/arctic_oil200805. 
 21. Scramble for the Arctic, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2007, 5:26 PM),  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/65b9692c-4e6f-11dc-85e7-0000779fd2ac.html 
#axzz3kPx5ew8r. See also Tom Parfitt, Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2007, 1:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/ 
russia.arctic (“Shortly before the dive, Mr. Chilingarov . . . told reporters his mission was 
to prove ‘the Arctic is Russian.’”).  
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voyage also “played to huge audiences in the Russian media and on 
state-run television, where the tone of the coverage resembled that given 
to Soviet cosmonauts.”22  These aggressive and boisterous domestic 
responses overrode calmer presentations of the mission to the wider 
world. In addition, the location of the flag planting and the action itself 
signaled conquest rather than exploration and accomplishment. The flag 
was placed on the Lomonosov Ridge, a disputed underwater ridge of 
continental crust claimed by Russia, Canada, and Denmark.23 The 
plunging of a flag into a desired territory conjured images from the past 
when European countries liberally conquered lands deemed terra 
nullius—i.e. ‘no man’s land’ for the taking.24  
As a result, alarmed and combative reactions from Arctic neighbors 
commenced almost immediately. The response of then-Canadian 
Defense Minister Peter McKay is the most widely noted:  
 
  
 22. Adam Wolfe, Russian Claims to Pole Foreshadow More Arctic Disputes to 
Come, WORLD POL. REV. (Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/ 
1019/russian-claims-to-pole-foreshadow-more-arctic-disputes-to-come. 
 23. Timothy J. Lindsay, (Un)Frozen Frontiers: A Multilateral Dispute Settlement 
Treaty for Resolving Boundary Disputes in the Arctic, 10 OIL GAS & ENERGY L.J. 4, 12 
(2012) (“Russia, Canada and Denmark (via Greenland) all lay claim to the Lomonosov 
Ridge, an unusual underwater ridge of continental crust in the Arctic Ocean spanning 
1800 km across the North Pole from the New Siberian Islands in Russia over the Arctic 
Ocean to Ellesmere Island of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Not only is the 
Lomonosov Ridge rich in oil, gas and raw metals, it runs across the Arctic Ocean passing 
under the North Pole and would hugely extend the territorial waters of any country that 
can lay claim to it.”).  
 24. E.g., Elle Stuart, The Polar Bear in the Room: The Role of Institutions in the 
Changing Arctic 19 (May 2014) (unpublished honors thesis, Stanford University) (on file 
with Stanford University Libraries), available at   
http://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/jr611wq3617 (“Despite the fact that Russia was 
well within their rights to explore the seabed under the North Pole and use that data to 
help their Arctic territorial claim under the Law of the Seas Treaty, the placement of the 
flag signaled more than just exploration to observers: it signaled possession.”); id. at 22 
(“The symbolic placement of the flag by the Russians in 2007 was nothing new in Arctic 
history; explorers have been planting flags and claiming territory for their respective 
countries in the Arctic since the late 19th century. However, unlike the Russian planting, 
the exploration and conquest of Arctic lands were accepted ways to claim territory in the 
19th and early 20th centuries.”). 
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This is the true north strong and free, and they’re fooling themselves if 
they think dropping a flag on the ocean floor is going to change 
anything. There is no question over Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. 
We’ve made that very clear. . . . You can’t go around the world these 
days dropping a flag somewhere. This isn’t the 14th or 15th century.25 
In turn, the then-Danish Science Minister and a legal adviser to the 
U.S. Secretary of State called the act a “provocation”26 and 
“provocative,”27 respectively. Arctic littoral state officials did, however, 
temper their reactions with acknowledgements that Russia’s exploit had 
no real legal or territorial significance.28 Yet the global media still took 
the dispute and ran, further fanning the flame “of competition, conflict, 
and crisis” through “headlines such as ‘Arctic Meltdown,’ ‘A New Cold 
War,’ and ‘Arctic Land Grab.’”29  
The incident, and ensuing rhetoric, thus turned mainstream 
international discourse on the Arctic into confrontational exchanges over 
seemingly unclaimed territory, and increased the public outcry for 
national missions bent on claiming Arctic territory and asserting northern 
sovereignty. It also, as a counterbalance, produced heated calls for an 
Arctic Treaty similar to that covering Antarctica—something Arctic 
littoral states are not keen to entertain given the consequent losses of 
  
 25. Breyfogle & Dunifon, supra note 19.  
 26. Thomas Buch-Andersen, Denmark Eyes North Pole Riches, BBC (Aug. 21, 
2007, 6:41 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6950517.stm.  
 27. Breyfogle & Dunifon, supra note 19. 
 28. E.g., Parfitt, supra note 21 (quoting then Canadian Defense Minister Peter 
McKay as saying, “we’re not at all concerned about this mission. Basically it’s just a 
show by Russia”); Russia Plants Flag on Arctic Floor, supra note 18 (quoting a U.S. State 
Department spokesman as saying, “[Russia’s flag planting] doesn’t have any legal 
standing or effect on this claim”).  
 29. Caitlyn L. Antrim, The Next Geographical Pivot: The Russian Arctic in the 
Twenty-First Century, 63 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 15, 15 (2010). Examples of such 
overblown coverage come from generally reputable sources, including: Foreign Affairs, 
The Telegraph, TIME, and the BBC.  See Borgerson, supra note 14; Russia’s Arctic 
Energy Plans Herald a New Cold War, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 18, 2008, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3562236/Russias-Arctic-energy-
plans-herald-a-new-Cold-War.html; James Graff, Artic: Fight for the Top of the World, 
TIME (Oct. 1, 2007), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,1663848,00.html; Paul Reynolds, Russia Ahead in Arctic ‘Gold Rush’, BBC 
(Aug. 1, 2007, 1:56 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6925853.stm. 
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sovereignty that would go along with such action.30 Altogether, these 
factors projected an anxious and unstable urgency over Arctic projects, 
operations, and relations. The situation escalated to the point that the five 
Arctic littoral states felt the need to officially address it.31 The Ilulissat 
Declaration, and its reassertion of regional cooperation and normality, 
was therefore born in response to a highly disruptive Arctic narrative that 
states—including the world’s superpower—feared might co-opt Arctic 
relations.32 
However, the idea that the Arctic is still somehow open for the taking 
shows tremendous resilience and continues to color a great deal of 
discussion concerning the region.33 Studies predicting the presence of 
substantial untapped Arctic natural resources—such as fossil fuels, 
fisheries, and minerals—and the co-developing imaginary of the region 
as a resource frontier have only served to reinforce this conception.34 As 
a result, the misguided perception persists that there exists not only 
territory in the High North to be claimed or lost, but also territory laden 
with valuable natural resources. Even world leaders have succumbed to 
this mistaken impression, with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
announcing, “Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our 
sovereignty over the Arctic. We either use it or lose it.”35  
  
 30. See STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 5, 146–50. 
 31. See id. at 2–5. 
 32. See id.  
 33. See generally Arsenault, supra note 13; Reiss, supra note 13; SALE & 
POTAPOV, supra note 14; Borgerson, supra note 14. 
 34. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: 
Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURV. 4 (2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf (“The 
total mean undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources of the Arctic are estimated to 
be approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 
billion barrels of natural gas liquids.”). See also Basia Rosenbaum, The Battle for Arctic 
Oil, HARV. INT’L REV. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://hir.harvard.edu/the-battle-for-arctic-oil/ 
(“[T]he Arctic is now a battleground over one of the most controversial resources of 
today—oil.”); Kristin Noelle Casper, Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic: Softening 
of Ice Demands Hardening of International Law, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 825, 826 (2009) 
(“[T]he [Arctic] meltdown presents lucrative opportunities for expanded access to new 
shipping routes, fisheries, and oil and gas resources.”).  
 35. Prime Minister Stephen Harper Announces New Arctic Offshore Patrol 
Ships, CAN. NEWS CENTRE (July 9, 2007), http://news.gc.ca/web/article-
en.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=&nid=335789&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D
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Addressing this situation, Steinberg et al. illuminate the “terra 
nullius” and “resource frontier” imaginaries, but they do so separately.36 
In actuality, these narratives have bled together to form a larger 
overarching imaginary: the “Arctic race.” There exists a popular 
understanding that there is a race to claim the Arctic, not just between 
Arctic states, but also among countries generally. This is exacerbated by 
overblown political and media reactions to Arctic state activities37 and 
the interest and actions of non-Arctic states and actors in the High North, 
particularly China and the European Union.38  
Yet the terra nullius, resource frontier, and Arctic race imaginaries 
are just that: imaginary. They were crafted and amplified as a result of 
factors largely superfluous to international law and governance regimes 
relevant to the Arctic, such as overblown declarations by politicians and 
media exaggeration. These compelling, but misinformed, influences have 
led to broad misunderstandings of Arctic affairs.  
Perhaps also perpetuating this confusion are territorial disagreements 
between Arctic littoral states. These disputes may make Arctic areas 
appear unclaimed and subject to a race when in fact they are governed by 
well-established and adhered-to diplomatic and legal frameworks—e.g. 




 36. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 19, 91. 
 37. See, e.g., Rick Noack, Denmark Stakes its Claim in the War for the North 
Pole, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2014),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/17/denmark-stakes-its-
claim-in-the-war-for-the-north-pole/; Katie Drummond, Cold Wars: Why Canada Wants 
to Claim the North Pole, VERGE (Dec. 9, 2013, 10:57 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/9/5191740/canada-russia-fight-over-north-pole-arctic; 
Lucas Laursen, Russian Claim Heats up Battle to Control Arctic Sea Floor, SCI. MAG., 
(Aug. 14, 2015, 7:27 AM), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/349/6249/678.full. 
 38. E.g., Didi Kirtsten Tatlow, China and the Northern Rivalry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
5, 2012, 2:07 AM), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/china-and-the-
northern-great-game/?_r=1; Jeff Stein, China Goes Polar, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 19, 2015, 
2:41 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/china-goes-polar-300554; Andreas Østhagen, The 
European Union – An Arctic Actor?, 15 J. MIL. & STRATEGIC STUD. 71, 72–75 (2013), 
available at https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24450/uploads; Duncan Depledge, The 
European Union in the Arctic, WORLD POL’Y (June 24, 2015, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2015/06/24/european-union-arctic. 
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For example, overlapping continental shelf claims are thus far being 
resolved through the agreed-upon adherence to UNCLOS delimitation 
provisions.39 This has involved the submission of national survey data to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 
established under UNCLOS, which will analyze the information and 
make scientific—and neutral—recommendations.40 It is, however, true 
that the CLCS “is not an arbitration body” and its findings do not 
definitively determine boundaries.41 Furthermore, Russia, Canada, and 
Denmark—the three Arctic states with overlapping continental shelf 
claims in the central Arctic Ocean—have opted out of dispute resolution 
mechanisms within UNCLOS.42 This means that, ultimately, their 
disagreement will have to be negotiated amongst themselves.  
Nevertheless, it is telling that these countries have tendered their 
survey materials to the CLCS and adhered to its submissions 
timeframe—that they must be made “within 10 years of the entry into 
force of [UNCLOS] for that State.”43 Given that Russia made the first 
submission in 2001, this means that Arctic littoral states have been 
engaging in the amicable resolution of their continental shelf claims for 
over a decade.44 Even though it may take “at least 10 years to verify all 
[of] the scientific data submitted by the coastal Arctic States,”45 such 
behavior bodes well for the continued, and ultimate peaceful and 
collective, resolution of this issue. And despite this process perhaps 
appearing chaotic and disagreeable to the uninitiated—and the media has 
not helped things by dramatizing the process46—the states involved have 
  
 39. See The Ilulissat Declaration: Arctic Ocean Conference, supra note 5.  
 40. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at annex II, art. 3.  
 41. Anna Stepanowa, Frozen but Desirable: Examining the Legal Regime of the 
Arctic, CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. (Jan. 19, 2015),  
http://cjicl.org.uk/2015/01/19/frozen-desirable-examining-legal-regime-arctic/. 
See also UNCLOS, supra note 11, at annex II, art. 9.  
 42. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
Declarations and Statements, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
convention_declarations.htm (last updated Sept. 2, 2015) (listing the reservations to 
UNCLOS made by party states). 
 43. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at annex II, art. 4.  
 44. Alf Håkon Hoel, The Legal-Political Regime in the Arctic, in GEOPOLITICS 
AND SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC: REGIONAL DYNAMICS IN A GLOBAL WORLD 49, 58 (Rolf 
Tamnes & Kristine Offerdal eds., 2014). 
 45. Stepanowa, supra note 41.  
 46. See e.g., supra note 34.  
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acted cooperatively throughout, apart from the occasional heated 
remark.47  
There are, however, aspects of Arctic activity that are race-like: states 
have limited windows within which to submit continental shelf claims to 
the CLCS;48 they must prepare and extend infrastructure and governance 
to the Arctic on pace with climate change and increasing activity;49 
resource dependent states like Russia must advance Arctic resource 
procurement to maintain government income in the face of declining 
southern reserves;50 and energy companies must act within the 
timeframes of their exploration and extraction licenses and when 
dynamic Arctic weather patterns allow.51 Nevertheless, there is no global 
race to claim territory or resources.  
In fact, Steinberg et al. make it clear that cooperation is far more 
rampant in the Arctic than competition.52 Even in the face of territorial 
disputes, Arctic littoral states actually help one another carry out the 
surveying missions necessary to complete their submissions to the 
CLCS.53   
  
 47. See Hoel, supra note 44, at 59. 
 48. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, at annex II, art. 4. 
 49. See Mary Beth West, Arctic Warming: Environmental, Human, and Security 
Implications, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1081, 1081 (2009); Michael T. Geiselhart, The 
Course Forward for Arctic Governance, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 155, 163 
(2014). 
 50. Dag Harald Claes & Arild Moe, Arctic Petroleum Resources in a Regional 
and Global Perspective, in GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC: REGIONAL 
DYNAMICS IN A GLOBAL WORLD 97, 108–12 (Rolf Tamnes & Kristine Offerdal eds., 
2014). 
 51. THE WILSON CENTER, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR ARCTIC OIL AND 
GAS DEVELOPMENT, 14 (2014), available at  
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Artic%20Report_F2.pdf.  
 52. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 32–33 (“Individuals involved in activities 
ranging from hazard planning and response to defense and security, from wildlife 
management to the promotion of scientific research, and from navigational assistance to 
environmental monitoring, all stressed that not only was the Arctic not a zone of 
exceptional conflict: it was a zone of exceptional cooperation, both in data-sharing and in 
joint operations.”).   
 53. E.g., U.S.-Canada Arctic Ocean Survey Partnership Saved Costs, Increased 
Data, NOAA (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011 
/20111215_arctic.html (highlighting surveying cooperation between the United States 
and Canada); Fisheries and Oceans Can., Defining Canada’s Continental Shelf, 
CANADA.CA, http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/hydrography-hydrographie/unclos-
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Yet despite the non-existence of an Arctic race, and the prevalence of 
Arctic cooperation, this imaginary and its constituents continue to exert a 
great deal of influence on regional relations by muddying the waters, 
eliciting reactions from officials, and increasing tensions.54 This makes 
levelheaded and shrewd analyses of the actual situation all the more 
important as a counterbalance. 
II.  EVOLVING INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE 
Notwithstanding the absence of an open Arctic resource frontier to be 
raced for, natural resources in the High North and their distribution are 
important factors in Arctic relations, development, and policy. Perhaps 
most prominently, resource reserves hold the key to the possible creation 
of a new state: Greenland.  
Greenland was ceded to Denmark by Norway in 1814 and, since the 
mid-twentieth century, has steadily been granted ever-greater 
autonomy.55 In 2009, Greenland gained self-rule, governing itself in all 
areas but foreign affairs and defense.56 Greenlanders were also 
  
eng.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2015) (highlighting surveying cooperation between Canada, 
the United States, and Denmark); see also Trude Pettersen, Norway, Russia Continue 
Coast Guard Cooperation, INDEP. BARENTS OBSERVER (Jan. 26, 2016), 
http://thebarentsobserver.com/security/2016/01/norway-russia-continue-coast-guard-
cooperation (reporting that Norway and Russia continue to engage in Arctic coast guard 
cooperation despite sharp disagreements on other issues). 
 54. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 24 (“[T]he idea of claiming broad swathes 
of Arctic territory regardless of whether it is land or water, has continued to hold sway 
over the popular (and, occasionally, governmental) imaginations in several Arctic 
countries.”). 
 55. Axel Kjær Sørensen, Greenland: From Colony to Home Rule, in ETHNICITY 
AND NATION BUILDING IN THE NORDIC WORLD 85, 85–105 (Sven Tägil ed., 1995). 
 56. Act on Greenland Self-Government, Act no. 473 of June 12, 2009 (Den.), 
available at http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/GR_Self-Government_UK.doc [hereinafter 
Act on Greenland]; see also Sarah Lyall, Fondly, Greenland Loosens Danish Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world/europe/ 
22greenland.html (“[Greenlandic autonomy], which allows Greenland to gradually take 
responsibility over areas like criminal justice and oil exploration, follows a referendum 
last year in which 76 percent of voters said they wanted self-rule. Many of the changes 
are deeply symbolic. Kalaallisut, a traditional Inuit dialect, is now the country’s official 
language, and Greenlanders are now recognized under international law as a separate 
people from Danes.”). 
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recognized as a separate people under international law and Greenlandic 
became the island’s sole official language.57  
Greenland, however, is still unviable as an independent state in large 
part because of its lack of a significant gross domestic product and 
government income. It is highly dependent on an annual block grant 
from Denmark to function.58 But, in 2009, Greenland also gained control 
over its natural resources and the income they may produce.59 Since 
Denmark has promised to honor the will of Greenland’s population,60 
revenue is integral to being able to responsibly vote for full 
independence and statehood, and the extraction of natural resources is 
the only realistic avenue through which to generate the requisite level of 
income.61 Steinberg et al. refer to the possibility of Greenlandic statehood 
and the movement behind it as the “indigenous statehood” imaginary.62  
  
 57. Act on Greenland, supra note 56, at ch. 7.  
 58. FRANK SEJERSEN, RETHINKING GREENLAND AND THE ARCTIC IN THE ERA OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE: NEW NORTHERN HORIZONS 26–27 (2015) (“Today, the block grant . . . 
is one of the main pillars in the Greenlandic economy.”); Mininnguaq Kleist, 
Greenland’s Self-Government, in POLAR LAW TEXTBOOK 186 (Natalia Loukacheva ed., 
2010) (“In 2009 the Danish block grant was around 55-60% of Greenland’s Finance 
Act’s incomes.”); see also THE COMMITTEE FOR GREENLANDIC MINERAL RESOURCES TO 
THE BENEFIT OF SOCIETY, TO THE BENEFIT OF GREENLAND 24 (2014), available at 
http://nyheder.ku.dk/groenlands-
naturressourcer/rapportogbaggrundspapir/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf (“Denmark 
is Greenland’s main trading partner, with about 2/3 of both imports and exports.”).  
 59. Act on Greenland, supra note 56, at ch. 3; see also SEJERSEN, supra note 58, 
at 84 (“[T]he act stipulates that all income from resources is to go to Greenland, with the 
one requirement that some part of this income is supposed to reduce the block grant from 
Denmark.”). 
 60. Act on Greenland, supra note 56, at ch. 8 (“Decision regarding Greenland’s 
independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland.”).  
 61. See Jeppe Strandsbjerg, Making Sense of Contemporary Greenland: 
Indigeneity, Resources and Sovereignty, in POLAR GEOPOLITICS? KNOWLEDGES, 
RESOURCES AND LEGAL REGIMES 267–68 (Richard C. Powell & Klaus Dodds eds., 2014) 
(“[I]ncreased autonomy . . . requires increased revenue and this means that the 
development of a new pillar of the economy based on natural resources is the official 
policy to lessen the dependence on Denmark.”).  
 62. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 67. It must be noted, however, that 
financial self-reliance and political independence based on natural resources are likely 
distant possibilities given the current pace of and impediments to Greenland’s 
development of such projects. E.g., The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to 
the Benefit of Society, supra note 58, at 23 (“In a scenario involving independence, it 
may be necessary to take another approach rather than following scenarios based solely 
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Greenland’s full independence would be a significant Arctic and 
global event. With almost 90% of its population being Inuit,63 Greenland 
would be the first majority Inuit state and the only majority indigenous 
state in the Arctic.64 Its statehood, however, could actually negatively 
impact indigenous interests and the voices of indigenous groups in Arctic 
affairs, perhaps considerably.  
Currently, within the Arctic Council—the predominant regional 
forum for conducting Arctic affairs—indigenous peoples are largely 
directly represented by six indigenous groups, which hold the status of 
Permanent Participants with full consultation rights in negotiations and 
decisions.65 One of the most prominent is the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(ICC).66  
Since Inuit populations span four Arctic countries—the United States, 
Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and Russia—the ICC pushes an 
international voice and understanding of Arctic and indigenous issues,67 a 
  
on the extraction of natural resources in order to generate sufficient economic but also 
demographic resources to achieve this.”); TIM BOERSMA & KEVIN FOLEY, THE 
GREENLAND GOLD RUSH: PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF GREENLAND’S ENERGY AND MINERAL 
RESOURCES VI (2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/ 
reports/2014/09/24-greenland-energy-mineral-resources-boersma-foley/24-greenland-
energy-mineral-resources-boersma-foley-pdf-2.pdf (observing that it could be decades 
before natural resource projects are completed and actually begin generating output and 
revenue). 
 63. Greenland, People and Society, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK,  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gl.html (last updated 
Feb. 11, 2016) (stating that Greenland’s population is 88% Inuit). 
 64. Mauro Mazza, The Prospects of Independence for Greenland, Between 
Energy Resources and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 6 BEIJING L. REV. 320, 321 
(2015) (remarking on how an independent Greenland would be “the first ‘Inuit State’ in 
human history”). See also Cécile Pelaudeix, Inuit Governance and Contemporary 
Challenges: New Questions for Arctic Governance, 4 Y.B. POLAR L. 155, 167 (2012) 
(“The Act on Greenland self-government signed in June 2009 granted unprecedented 
rights to an Inuit government.”). 
 65. Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http:// www.arctic-council.org/ 
index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/123-resources/about/permanent-
participants (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 66. Timo Koivurova, Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly 
Changing Scene of Arctic Governance, 46 POLAR REC. 146, 151 (2009) (noting that the 
ICC is “one of the strongest of Arctic Council permanent participants”). 
 67. Inuit Circumpolar Council Charter & Bylaws, INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL 
CAN., http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/charter--bylaws.html (last visited May 7, 2016) 
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conception Steinberg et al. term the “transcendent nationhood” 
imaginary.68 But this conflicts with a state-centered understanding of 
Arctic affairs and core state interests in sovereignty and autonomy, and 
therein lies the difficulty.69  
Being a majority Inuit polity, Greenland is very important to the ICC 
and its agenda, and Arctic indigenous concerns generally.70 Moreover, 
not being a state and being subject to a distant western power has 
historically served to make Greenland’s interests align with those of the 
ICC.71 But as Greenland edges closer to statehood, its priorities and 
positions have shifted to reflect a more state-centered approach to its 
own affairs and broader Arctic issues, and it has moved away from the 
ICC.72 Illustrative of this process is the fact that Greenland has 
significantly lowered its funding contributions to the Council.73  
  
(asserting “[t]hat the worlds [sic] arctic and sub-arctic areas which we use and occupy 
transcend political boundaries”). 
 68. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 113.   
 69. Id. at 72–76. 
 70. See Jessica Shadian, Not Seeing Like a State: Inuit Diplomacies Meet State 
Sovereignty, in DIPLOMATIC CULTURES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: TRANSLATIONS, 
SPACES AND ALTERNATIVES 154, 160–66 (Jason Dittmer & Fiona McConnell eds., 2016) 
(presenting the history of the ICC, which was partially created through a desire for 
greater autonomy for Greenland and has consistently championed the allocation to 
Greenland of greater powers of self-determination from Denmark). See also Andrew D. 
Emhardt, Climate Change and the Inuit: Bringing an Effective Human Rights Claim to 
the United Nations, 24 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 515, 538 (2014) (highlighting “the 
important cooperative relationship that the Greenland branch of the ICC has with the 
government of Greenland”). 
 71. See Peter Jull, Greenland’s Home Rule and Arctic Sovereignty: A Case Study, 
in SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND THE ARCTIC 1, 4 (1986), available at 
http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:10989/jullgreen03.pdf (explaining how 
Greenland has relied on its leaders’ involvement with the ICC to participate in 
international relations, thus circumventing the country’s lack of control over its foreign 
affairs—a power retained by Denmark). 
 72. See Hannes Gerhardt, The Inuit and Sovereignty: The Case of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference and Greenland, 14 POLITIK 1, 12 (2011) (“[A]n [independent 
Greenland] and the transformation needed to bring it about would in all likelihood lead 
very far away from the cultural integrity that is largely at the root of the aims of the ICC 
and its conception of the Inuit’s position with regard to sovereignty.”). See also 
Pelaudeix, supra note 64, at 167–68 (noting “the growing gulf” between the interests of 
the ICC and government of Greenland); Jeppe Strandsbjerg, Cartography and 
Geopolitics in the Arctic Region, 19 (DIIS Working Paper 2010), available at 
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/44619/1/637349717.pdf (questioning whether 
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Beyond simply drifting apart, the degree to which Greenland and the 
ICC might actually come into opposition as the former’s progression to 
statehood continues, or when it culminates, is potentially significant. 
Statehood would provide Greenland with a much more powerful voice 
within the current state-centered regime of Arctic and international 
relations and make it a sovereign peer within this system. The nation 
would therefore be heavily incentivized to promote state-centered Arctic 
governance to preserve its newfound dominant position and sovereignty. 
The ICC could potentially become a major liability and challenger to this 
in that it actively seeks to marshal a vast majority of Greenland’s 
population around an international, non-state-centered political 
movement and regime.74 Thus, a majority Inuit state may come into sharp 
conflict with the predominant international Inuit organization.  
This dichotomy between the course of Greenland’s quest for 
statehood and its evolving interests on the one hand, and the ICC’s goals 
of an international system of Arctic governance on the other, will have 
profound effects on Arctic indigenous affairs. These effects will likely be 
myriad, but the progression and realization of the indigenous statehood 
imaginary may actually hamper the idea of transcendent nationhood and 
Arctic indigenous considerations overall by materially shifting the 
political position and priorities of Greenland’s important Inuit 
population.  
III.   PRESERVING THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT 
Greenland’s statehood and development, as noted above, are highly 
contingent on natural resource procurement and income derived 
  
the interests of an Inuit state based in the Westphalian system of state-centered 
sovereignty would be compatible with the non-Westphalian positions put forth by the 
ICC). 
 73. ICC Greenland Shocked at Proposed Funding Cuts, ARCTIC J. (Nov. 5, 2013, 
8:00 AM), http://arcticjournal.com/politics/230/icc-greenland-shocked-proposed-funding-
cuts (“Greenland’s proposed budget for 2014 cuts annual funding for the Greenlandic 
branch of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) from 5.4 million Danish kroner ($1 
million) to 1.4 million Danish kroner.”).  
 74. See Strandsbjerg, supra note 61, at 262 (“Not only [does the ICC] stress that 
the Arctic is their home, they also claim there is a need to reconsider categories 
governing international relations, and move away from a traditional Westphalian 
conception of state, sovereignty, and law.”). 
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therefrom.75 This brings one of the most contentious and publicized 
disputes concerning the Arctic to the fore: resource extraction versus 
environmental protection.76  
Steinberg et al. refer to the view of the Arctic as a vulnerable 
environment that must be staunchly protected from human encroachment 
as the “nature reserve” imaginary.77 Quite astutely, however, they note 
that this view is rarely espoused in its absolute form: that humans and 
human activity have no place in the High North.78 But the vision of the 
Arctic as an unspoiled natural space attracts a large amount of support—
particularly from environmental groups and activists—and leads many to 
passionately oppose northern commercial and industrial ventures.79  
It is quite right that the Arctic has historically remained relatively 
removed from human impact,80 and its ecosystems have been shown to 
  
 75. See id. at 267–68. 
 76. E.g., GAIL OSHERENKO & ORAN R. YOUNG, THE AGE OF THE ARCTIC: HOT 
CONFLICTS AND COLD REALITIES 5 (1989) (“[I]n this Age of the Arctic, the land of 
permafrost has become the scene of pitched battles between environmentalists or 
preservationists and consumptive users of natural resources, be they hunters or oil 
drillers.”). 
 77. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 141–42. 
 78. Id. at 142.  
 79. See The Arctic, OCEAN CONSERVANCY, http://www.oceanconservancy.org/ 
places/arctic/?referrer=https://www.google.com/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (“The Arctic 
is one of Earth’s last pristine ecosystems.”); Saving the Arctic, GREENPEACE, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/arctic/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (asserting that the best 
way to protect the Arctic Ocean, its wildlife, and its people is to set it aside as a protected 
sanctuary); Dan Joling, After Shell Decision, Environmental Groups Seek Arctic Ban, but 
Offshore Drilling Isn’t Dead, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 29, 2015, 6:41 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/09/29/alaska-braces-for-fallout-of-
shell-arctic-drilling-decision (“Royal Dutch Shell’s decision to end its quest for oil in the 
Arctic waters off Alaska sparked jubilation among environmental activists, who said 
Tuesday that they will seize the opportunity to seek an end to all drilling to [sic] in the 
region.”); John Vidal, Mining Threatens to Eat up Northern Europe’s Last Wilderness, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/ 
sep/03/mining-threat-northern-europe-wilderness-finland-sweden-norway 
(“[C]onservationists say the rush [to mine in the European Arctic] could bring permanent 
damage to the vast network of rivers, lakes and mountains which are home to . . . 
Europe’s largest mammals.”). 
 80. E.g., David R. Klein, Arctic Grazing Systems and Industrial Development: 
Can we Minimize Conflicts?, 19 POLAR RES. 91, 91 (2000) (“Historically, the lands of the 
Arctic and adjacent northern forests experienced few effects of the rapidly developing 
and expanding industrialized world to the south.”). 
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be very vulnerable to negative outcomes as climate change makes 
northern projects more viable and reaps its own effects.81 Yet the Arctic 
has experienced human habitation for thousands of years,82 as well as 
varying intensities of commercial and industrial activity.83  
  
 81. E.g., John C. Fyfe et al., One Hundred Years of Arctic Surface Temperature 
Variation Due to Anthropogenic Influence, 3 SCI. REP. 1, 5–6 (2013) (finding that the 
Arctic is warming due to human-induced climate change through a comparison of models 
both containing and lacking anthropogenic factors); Kathy A. Burek et al., Effects of 
Climate Change on Arctic Marine Mammal Health, 18 ECOLOG. APP. 126, 127–31 (2008) 
(assessing the possible and likely negative impacts that climate change will have on 
Arctic marine mammals); Ragnhildur Gunnarsdóttir et al., A Review of Wastewater 
Handling in the Arctic with Special Reference to Pharmaceuticals and Personal Care 
Products (PPCPs) and Microbial Pollution, 50 ECOLOG. ENG’G 76, 83 (2013) 
(establishing that wastewater treatment “is often inadequate or completely lacking in 
Arctic regions” and that this can lead to environmental damage); Galina Kashulina et al., 
Sulphur in the Arctic Environment: Environmental Impact, 124 ENVTL. POLLUTION 151, 
151 (2003) (“Long term, high level airborne emissions of pollutants from nickel 
industries on the Kola Peninsula (NW Russia) have resulted in widespread ecosystem 
injury up to almost complete vegetation eradication within nearest surroundings of the 
smelters.”).  
 82. E.g., Pavel Pavlov, John Inge Svendsen & Svein Indrelid, Human Presence in 
the European Arctic Nearly 40,000 Years Ago, 413 NATURE 64 (2001) (presenting 
research into the oldest documented evidence of human presence in the Arctic); Janusz 
Kozlowski & H.G. Bandi, The Paleohistory of Circumpolar Arctic Colonization, 37 
ARCTIC 359 (1984) (detailing the colonization of the Arctic by humans over the course of 
thousands of years).  
 83. E.g., Gérard Duhaime & Andrée Caron, The Economy of the Circumpolar 
Arctic, in THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH 17, 22 (Solveig Glomsrød & Iulie Aslaksen eds., 
2006) (“The circumpolar Arctic is exploited as a vast reservoir of natural resources that 
are destined for the southern, non-Arctic, parts of the countries that also include Arctic 
regions, and more broadly to global markets. The Arctic is a major producer of 
hydrocarbons, minerals and marine resources, whose importance is confirmed by the very 
value of the resources produced. The economy of the Arctic is also characterized by large 
service industries, particularly through the role of the State. . . . [But] circumpolar 
economic activity is unequally distributed among the different Arctic regions.”); Herbert 
C. Hanson, Importance and Development of the Reindeer Industry in Alaska, 5 J. RANGE 
MGMT. 243 (1952) (analyzing the development and importance of the reindeer industry in 
an area of the Arctic); John Bockstoce, From Davis Strait to Bering Strait: The Arrival of 
the Commercial Whaling Fleet in North America’s Western Arctic, 37 ARCTIC 528 (1984) 
(presenting the history of the whaling industry in an area of the Arctic); C.J. Webster, The 
Economic Development of the Soviet Arctic and Sub-Arctic, 29 SLAVONIC & EAST EUR. 
REV. 177, 177 (1950) (“The economic development of the Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic 
has a long history.”). 
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Moreover, inaccurate and paternalistic assumptions often accompany 
environmental arguments: that northern inhabitants somehow lack the 
desire for and/or are better off without material development and modern 
opportunities.84 It is one thing to advocate inaction and steadfast 
environmental protection when someone does not live in the area at 
issue. But it is quite another when one not only resides there, but also 
faces drastically lower educational, health, and economic outcomes when 
compared to more southern populations,85 particularly when those Arctic 
areas where resource operations are taking place have the highest 
economic indicators.86  
  
 84. There have historically been severe problems when outside actors try to 
control the development potential and economic engagement of Arctic populations. See 
Chris Southcott & Valoree Walker, A Portrait of the Social Economy in Northern 
Canada, 30 N. REV. 13, 15 (2009) (examining the detrimental social and physical 
impacts when the Canadian government and industry attempted to keep Arctic 
indigenous populations isolated from northern development in the early and mid-
twentieth century).  
 85. E.g., Serena Ableson, Bringing Legal Education to the Canadian Arctic: The 
Development of the Akitsiraq Law School and the Challenges for Providing Library 
Services to a Non-traditional Law School, 34 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 5 (2006) (“Statistics 
show that there is a need to provide education opportunities for residents in Nunavut. The 
territory has one of the fastest growing youth populations in all of Canada. However, 
approximately 42% of population over the age of 15 have no schooling past Grade 9. 
Furthermore, only 12% of the adult population have a university degree.”); Chris 
Southcott, Socio-Economic Trends in the Canadian North: Comparing Provincial and 
Territorial Norths, 38 N. REV. 155, 165, 169 (2014) (presenting survey data and research 
showing that the education levels across northern Canada are below those of southern 
population centers and that unemployment rates are almost universally higher); Yereth 
Rosen, Research Commission Examines Mental Health Issues in the Arctic, ALASKA 
DISPATCH NEWS (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.adn.com/article/20150824/research-
commission-examines-mental-health-issues-arctic (“[M]ental-health and behavioral 
issues pose dire risks to Arctic residents, who suffer from high rates of violence and 
depression.”); Peter Bjerregaard, et al., Indigenous Health in the Arctic: An Overview of 
the Circumpolar Inuit Population, 32 SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 390, 391 (2004) 
(finding that incidences of infectious and chronic disease, accidents, suicides, violence, 
and substance abuse among Arctic indigenous populations are high compared to other 
regions); ORAN R. YOUNG, ARCTIC POLITICS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE 
CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH 216–17 (1992) (“Like many developing countries, Arctic 
communities are often heavily dependent for their cash income on a single industry or 
product. This accounts for the dramatic economic swings or boom/bust cycles that 
commentators on Arctic affairs have often described.”).  
 86. E.g., Duhaime & Caron, supra note 83, at 22 (“Those [Arctic regions] with 
plentiful natural resources, particularly non-renewable resources, have a level of 
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As with Greenland, natural resource projects are the sole realistic 
means of substantial revenue generation and development for many 
northern areas.87 Research shows that environmental groups have had 
trouble gaining traction for their conservationist stances and the nature 
reserve imaginary because of a skewed focus on the environment to the 
detriment of considerations of human wellbeing and opportunity.88 While 
it is true that commercial actors largely concentrate on profit 
maximization, and such a singular approach should be offset by 
environmental and other concerns, Arctic residents maintain more 
diverse positions, which include interests in simultaneously protecting 
the area they call home and improving their wellbeing by capitalizing on 
local resources.89  
Nothing written here should be construed as discounting the 
exceptional vulnerability of Arctic environments to direct human activity 
and climate change generally. However, movements for northern 
environmental protection must meaningfully address the concerns of 
local inhabitants. Ultimately, the balance between the interests of 
environmentalists, industry, and locals will be key to the sensible 
stewardship of the region for future generations.  
IV.  GUNS AND ICE 
Amid the many interests orbiting and intersecting with the Arctic, 
there are also those focusing on national and international security. A 
  
economic activity well above the Arctic average.”). However, the substantial pitfalls of 
an economy dependent on resource extraction must be kept in mind, and such industries 
should ideally be used as a means to generate revenue for reinvestment in economic 
diversification and services. See YOUNG, supra note 85, at 216–17.  
 87. E.g., Duhaime & Caron, supra note 83, at 18 (explaining that the “primary 
sector” of the circumpolar economy is “[b]ased essentially on the exploitation of natural 
resources.”). 
 88. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 143. 
 89. See, e.g., Craig Welch, Why Alaska’s Inupiat Are Warming to Offshore Oil 
Drilling, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (May 22, 2015),  
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/05/150522-Inupiat-Shell-offshore-oil-Arctic- 
Alaska-ocean-whale-sea/#.VcmOJ-vWGL8.email; Heather Exner-Pirot, Whose Arctic is 
it? The Ethics of Arctic Campaigning, WORLD POLICY BLOG (Oct. 28, 2015, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2015/10/28/whose-arctic-it-ethics-arctic-campaigning. 
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significant conceptualization of the High North is as an increasingly 
important military and strategic theater.  
During World War II, fighting raged across the Arctic, as it did across 
the globe. Vicious sea battles occurred as Nazi Germany attempted to 
halt Allied Arctic supply convoys headed from the United Kingdom and 
United States to the Soviet Union over Scandinavia.90 In addition, land 
combat took place in Northern Norway between the Allies and Germany, 
and in the Arctic areas of Finland and the Soviet Union as the two 
countries battled each other in the Winter and Continuation wars.91  
Following World War II, the High North became a metaphor for the 
widely divided political positions and frozen relations of the United 
States and Soviet Union. But, more than that, the area was also an angle 
of vulnerability that needed to be both guarded and taken advantage of.92 
Hence the Arctic became a region of perpetual military readiness and 
vigilance, particularly for submarine, long-range bomber, ballistic 
missile, and missile detection and defense capabilities.93  
  
 90. E.g., MICHAEL G. WALLING, FORGOTTEN SACRIFICE: THE ARCTIC CONVOYS OF 
WORLD WAR II (2012) (detailing the Allied maritime supply route through the Arctic and 
the German effort to stop it).  
 91. For presentations of these operations, see, for example, CHRIS MANN & 
CHRISTER JÖRGENSEN, HITLER’S ARCTIC WAR: THE GERMAN CAMPAIGNS IN NORWAY, 
FINLAND AND THE USSR 1940-1945 (2002); BOB CARRUTHERS, HITLER’S FORGOTTEN 
ARMIES: COMBAT IN NORWAY AND FINLAND (2013); VINCENT HUNT, FIRE AND ICE: THE 
NAZIS’ SCORCHED EARTH CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY (2014); PHILIP S. JOWETT & BRENT 
SNODGRASS, FINLAND AT WAR 1939-45 (2006); HENRIK O. LUNDE, FINLAND’S WAR OF 
CHOICE: THE TROUBLED GERMAN-FINNISH COALITION IN WWII (2013).  
 92. Rolf Tamnes & Sven G. Holtsmark, The Geopolitics of the Arctic in 
Historical Perspective, in GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC: REGIONAL 
DYNAMICS IN A GLOBAL WORLD 12, 21–22 (Rolf Tamnes & Kristine Offerdal eds., 2014).  
 93. E.g., Rob Huebert, Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the 
Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT’L J. 203, 205–06 (1999) (asserting that “[t]he Arctic became 
one of the most militarized regions during the cold war” as the United States and Soviet 
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Yet when the Soviet Union dissolved, taking the Cold War with it, the 
Arctic’s strategic significance dropped off precipitously.94 Even prior to 
these events, in 1987, then-Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 
advocated for the Arctic to be made a “zone of peace.”95 In the following 
years, Russia reduced its Arctic forces considerably and the region was 
no longer viewed as an icy battleground.96 In fact, it was hardly viewed 
strategically at all except for outer space operations, early warning 
missile defense systems, and Russia’s northern shipyards.97  
But Russian-western relations are now at their lowest point since the 
fall of the Iron Curtain.98 Russia’s destabilization of Ukraine—beginning 
in early 2014—invited western countermeasures in the form of a broad 
sanctions regime.99 These actions have had a hand in severely harming 
the Russian economy.100 In addition, Russia’s military intervention in the 
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the Soviet Union.”).  
 95. Philip Taubman, Soviet Proposes Arctic Peace Zone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 
1987),  
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/02/world/soviet-proposes-arctic-peace-zone.html.   
 96. The Russian military drawdown in the Arctic was part of the broader 
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foreign direct investment in Russia, capital flight, bars on borrowing for Russian banks, 
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Syrian Civil War on the side of President Bashar Al-Assad—and against 
western-backed rebels—further hardened Russian-western differences.101 
Prior to and throughout these maneuvers, Russia has broadly increased 
its regional and international assertiveness, maintained provocative 
military postures, and put a renewed focus on military readiness and 
investment.102  
The Arctic, as yet another converging point of western and Russian 
interests, has failed to remain isolated from the aforementioned elevation 
in international tensions.103  
Steinberg et al., however, limit their analysis of the Arctic as a 
strategic theater to the Cold War, and present this information only 
relatively briefly.104 Therefore, in order to present a more complete 
contemporary picture of the most prominent competing Arctic 
narratives—and meaningfully expose readers to one of the most 
important—this Article presents an original conception: the “strategic 
Arctic” imaginary.  
With the recent deterioration in Russian-western relations has come a 
renewed military focus on the Arctic by littoral states. Russia has 
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b893e7ac3fb3_story.html. But it is important to note that the parallel sharp decline in oil 
prices brought on by a glut in international supply is likely wreaking the majority of 
havoc on the Russian economy. E.g., id. (“Although sanctions have hurt, much of 
Russia’s current economic weakness has to do with the 48 percent drop in the price of oil 
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instituted the large-scale development and enlargement of its northern 
capabilities, including restoring previously abandoned Soviet bases, 
building new bases, increasing the number of troops deployed to the 
north, creating Arctic-specific units, and conducting more military 
exercises in the region.105  
Despite Russia’s considerable national interests in the Arctic that 
legitimize expanding its northern strategic posture—e.g. resources, 
shipping lanes, and the largest Arctic population, coast line, and territory 
of any state106—the country’s continued belligerence on the international 
stage, and in the Arctic specifically, has caused its circumpolar neighbors 
to worry about its northern actions.107 In particular, Norway has 
expressed alarm,108 and it engaged in a massive reorientation of its 
defense capabilities northward, stepped up defense acquisitions intended 
for Arctic deployment,109 and carried out its first extensive military 
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maneuvers in its northern province bordering Russia since the end of the 
Cold War.110 Norway also advocates for NATO to step up its focus on 
the High North and has organized Arctic military exercises bringing 
together NATO members, Sweden, and Finland.111 Russia’s responses to 
the aforementioned Norwegian and multilateral trainings included 
placing its Arctic forces on full combat alert and conducting rival 
drills.112  
Aside from Norway, however, the reactions of other Arctic states to 
Russian actions have been more moderate. They have broadly voiced 
their disapproval of Russian aggressiveness and taken part in northern 
exercises, but have not instituted any substantial changes to their 
northern defense postures.113 Nevertheless, each Arctic littoral state has 
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updated its official northern strategic outlook in recent years due to 
Russian, and climate change, developments.114  
At least in the near term, relations between Russia and the West are 
likely to remain poor. As a result, the inclination to understand the Arctic 
mainly as a domain of strategic competition and conflict will remain 
strong. This makes the continuation and expansion of cooperation, 
dialogues, and information sharing all the more important so that 
international tensions infect the region as little as possible. While the risk 
of conflict in the High North is low in the immediate future due to the 
Arctic’s remoteness, harsh environment, and established cooperative 
regime, it is more likely to remain so in the long-term through the active 
subjugation of the strategic Arctic imaginary to the understanding of the 
region as a place of collaboration and trust.  
CONCLUSION 
Climate change, northern natural resources, regional politics, and 
international relations have all combined to increase the Arctic’s global 
significance. To this end, “preconceptions of what the Arctic is, and what 
it can be, matter profoundly.”115 Determining whether the High North is 
viewed as a place of cooperation or conflict, transcendent nationhood or 
state-centered governance, untouchable wilderness or untapped potential, 
or some mixture of these representations is of the utmost importance in 
resolving its future. 
By methodically engaging and assessing the most influential Arctic 
imaginaries, this Article will hopefully contribute to an informed 
discourse on international law, governance, and relations in the High 
North, and help to counteract the hyperbolic treatments of this region of 
the world that have become far too common.  
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